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Abstract. Various agile methods have several quality assurance mechanisms
embedded in the process itself, without any explicit QA role. In principle, the
team takes care of quality assurance during sprints and as part of daily stand-ups,
sprint reviews and retrospectives. We have deﬁned SafeScrum, a variant of Scrum
with some additional XP techniques that can be used to develop safety-critical
software and have the software certiﬁed according to the IEC 61508 standard.
This imposes a load of additional requirements on the process. In a recent indus‐
trial case, we have experienced that the quality assurance mechanisms in Scrum
becomes insuﬃcient. We have therefore analyzed the standard, consulted an
independent assessor and worked with the Scrum team to identify necessary
additional tasks for a team-internal QA role to be added to the SafeScrum process.
Keywords: Safety critical software · Scrum · Safescrum · IEC61508 · Quality
assurance
1 Introduction
Agile software development methods and in particular variants of Scrum, often in
combination with XP techniques, has had a large uptake in the software industry over
the past decade. One of the many aspects of Scrum and similar approaches is that quality
assurance is embedded in the process itself, and not explicitly documented. A Scrum
team is supposed to be self-sustained, not having to rely on an external quality manage‐
ment or assurance function like a QA manager or QA department. The latter has been
a typical role in line organizations doing plan-based development [19, 20]. First of all,
a Scrum project enforces visibility and has frequent evaluation of status, progress and
problems, which is used to re-plan and improve the project based on the most recent and
updated knowledge. Scrum also has dedicated activities for managing quality issues
with both the product under development and the process itself; each short work-period,
or sprint, concludes with a sprint review and potentially also a retrospective. The former
evaluate the results so far and the latter evaluates the process itself to identify
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improvement needs and opportunities. Scrum also strongly emphasizes frequent inter‐
action with the customer or the problem owner, and XP stresses continuous and frequent
testing. This is necessary to ensure that the functionality as well as the quality of the
system meets requirements and expectations. In short– Scrum can be seen as a combined
and self-sustained planning, development, and quality assurance process, although
lacking traceability.
Scrum was initially designed for small development projects with small self-
managed teams, solving small-scale problems. Research from the past decade provides
examples that this works well and that Scrum projects are more eﬀective and ﬂexible
than plan-driven projects [4]. However, the trend in the software industry today is that
Scrum is being used in increasingly more complex settings. We see cases where globally
distributed Scrum teams collaborate in developing large software systems [6]. We also
see that Scrum is being used for development of safety-critical systems, which have to
comply with strict quality and safety standards [5, 14, 18].
This trend of increasing complexity means that the core principles of self-sustained,
multi-disciplinary, and self-managed teams are challenged. In this paper, we look into
how this development aﬀects the embedded quality assurance function in Scrum. We
base our analysis and discussion on an ongoing industry case where a Scrum team
develops a high-integrity ﬁre and gas detection system where the goal is to achieve a
SIL3 (SIL: Safety Integrity Level) rating according to the IEC61508 standard [7]. The
Scrum process used by the team is adjusted and continuously reﬁned to match the
requirements of the IEC61508 standard; we name this variant SafeScrum [18] (see
Sect. 4 for more details).
In the following, we present some background on the inherent challenges when
developing and certifying safety-critical systems, on how SafeScrum can be adapted to
support this process and the role of quality management and assurance. We then look
into our case to show how this is being done in practical terms before we use our insights
from the case to discuss how Scrum can be enforced to manage quality in high
complexity settings.
2 Quality Assurance in Agile Software Development
Mnkandla and Duolatzky gives a thorough discussion of the use of the term quality [11].
Most of the deﬁnitions identiﬁed by the two authors have a production focus and are not
relevant for development. The concept of quality– software or otherwise – is deﬁned by
ISO 9000 as “the totality of characteristics of an entity that bear on its ability to satisfy
stated and implied needs”. According to this deﬁnition, the main concept of quality is
to make the customer happy. Deliver a quality product thus means to deliver a product
that is according to the customer’s speciﬁed and implied requirements. Sticking with
older deﬁnitions – e.g., quality is conformance to speciﬁcations – ignore the customer
and is not a smart move in a competitive industry.
Inherent in the plan-driven approach to software development is the idea that all
requirements are known at the start of the project. With faster innovation, more rapid
requirement changes, and more volatility allowed in the prioritized tasks, this idea is
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void. Plan-driven development creates a signiﬁcant risk that the users’ requirements
remain unclear or that important opportunities for innovation are missed. The problem
is that up-front requirements become increasingly irrelevant as the pace of innovation
quickens and customers’ expectancy to ﬁt-for-use rises. Consequently, the discrepancy
between software practice, end-users and traditional requirements speciﬁcation widens.
Requirements that are out of sync with real needs has been claimed as a common cause
of terminated IT projects [13].
Agile development attempts to allow for frequent updates of the requirements as the
customer’s needs and problem understanding develop over time, thus increasing the
probability of delivering improved product quality.
3 Safety Critical Software Development
A system is deﬁned as safety-critical if a failure may result in death or severe injury to
people, loss or severe damage to property, or harm to the environment. Examples of
such systems are ﬁre alarm systems (failing to sound an alarm may cause casualties) or
railway signaling systems (signal error may lead to collisions etc.). Safety critical
systems are found in almost all parts of our daily lives, from transportation, to energy
systems, in medical devices etc. Traditionally, such systems have been hardware reliant,
but as hardware has become more powerful, ﬂexible and programmable, the trend is that
larger parts of the total system are implemented in software, meaning that the software
complexity is growing. For example, the top-notch ﬁghter plane of the forties, the Spit‐
ﬁre, had zero lines of code. Today, the F-35 ﬁghter has about 8 million lines of code
where most of them comprise what could be deﬁned a safety critical system [10].
Safety critical systems may be classiﬁed with a SIL value, deﬁning the level of
performance of the safety function of the system, or in other words, how likely the system
is to operate as intended. The classiﬁcation of levels varies between diﬀerent standards,
but for IEC61508, which is relevant to our case, SIL is divided from 1 to 4 where SIL
4 is the highest safety integrity level.
In order to use a safety critical system, the customer needs a certiﬁcate. A “software
certiﬁcation demonstrates the reliability and safety of software systems in such a way
that it can be checked by an independent authority with minimal trust in the techniques
and tools used in the certiﬁcation process itself” [3]. The certiﬁcate is an independent
document that ensures that the system operates as speciﬁed and according to the safety
standard. This introduces the role of the assessor, an independent third party with the
responsibility of assessing and eventually certifying that the development process
leading to the system is compliant with the requirements in the standard. It is important
to understand that a standard like IEC 61508 mainly has requirements for the process.
As stated in the introduction: “This International Standard sets out a generic approach
for all safety lifecycle activities for systems comprised of electrical and/or electronic
and/or programmable electronic (E/E/PE) elements that are used to perform safety func‐
tions.” E.g., the section on architecture contains material on how to select architecture
but no material on what the architecture should look like.
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In practical terms, the standard is a list of good software engineering practices [15].
These must be followed or argued irrelevant. The designated SIL determines which
requirements that are recommended or highly recommended. The assessor bases the
assessment on proof of compliance, which are various types of information showing
how requirements have been met. Providing such documentation imposes a large extra
eﬀort on the development project and in some cases it may actually constitute up to 50%
of the total development cost [14].
Looking back at the past decades, we see that the development process of safety
critical systems is optimized for hardware development, where design decisions have
to be made early and locked prior to implementation to avoid late change in design,
which may impose very high costs. Normally some variant of the V-model is used to
guide design, implementation, testing and validation.
As shown in Fig. 1, integration and validation testing is done on the right side of the
V–meaning that a large part of the code-related documentation is made after coding.
While a natural approach for most hardware development, this may impose problems
for an agile software development project. Here, new or changed requirements will often
lead to changes in the low-level design, which may then lead to changes in the code. In
these cases, it is important to have well-documented code plus traceability from require‐
ments, via architecture and design down to code.
Fig. 1. The V-model
During software development is it important to control size and complexity.
Complexity is obvious – high complexity hinders understanding and can thus lead to
errors. However, experience shows that sheer size also will create problems for devel‐
opers since a large code volume makes it diﬃcult to keep the overview, which again
leads to coding errors.
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4 SafeScrum – Agile Development of Safety Critical Software
SafeScrum is a variant of the well-known and extensively used Scrum development
model [16] where some additional elements are added to be able to fulﬁll the process
requirements from the IEC61508 standard [18]. Based on a thorough investigation of
the requirements in the standards part 3 which deﬁnes the software part of the total
system [14], we propose a set of extensions to make Scrum applicable to development
of safety critical software. Firstly, there are two backlogs, one for functional require‐
ments and one for safety requirements. Functional requirements may change frequently
whilst safety requirements normally are stable and even reusable between projects and
products. Relationships between these are maintained to keep track of which safety
requirements that are aﬀected by which functional requirements. Secondly, SafeScrum
needs to be a traceable process. All decisions and changes throughout development must
be documented, stored and made available to the assessor. The same goes for code
reviews where all remarks and how they were resolved needs to be kept track of. Thirdly,
each sprint encompasses a validation of the safety of the present system. As part of the
sprint review of each sprint, the product backlog may be updated. In cases where a
change is considered to aﬀect the safety of the system, a change impact analysis (CIA)
[17] is done – and documented. Here the two backlogs come in handy as a mean to
identify how a change related to a functional requirement potentially inﬂuences a safety
requirement. Besides these extensions, common features of agile practices are important,
like test-driven development (important to establish high test coverage), regular work
iterations, daily stand-ups, and continuous integration.
A series of sprints replace the ‘coding’ part and the ‘evaluation’ part of the V-model.
This means that documentation is produced continuously and as a part of development
and not as a ﬁnalizing phase as described by the V-model. SafeScrum simply replaces
the bottom and right side of the V-model. This is fundamentally important for software
development and enables a project to become more ﬂexible with respect to changes and
still be able to provide the needed documentation and traceability to the assessor.
Adding these new elements to Scrum is necessary to meet the requirements of the
IEC61508 standard. However, this also compromises the concept of a lightweight
process as a lot of extra work, checkpoints and especially documentation are added. The
most important countermeasure is clever and eﬃcient use of tools to automate as much
of the extras as possible. We have identiﬁed four classes of tools. Firstly, we need a tool
to support process and workﬂow management, like deﬁning, assigning and following
up tasks, their responsibilities and order, etc. Put simply, this is a tool to automate the
Scrum board. Secondly, we need tools to establish and maintain traceability of require‐
ments, tests and code. Even a small project will generate large amounts of information,
which requires tool support. Thirdly, we need dedicated tools for managing information
like design, code and architectural documentation. Fourthly, we need tools to support
code quality assurance, which is particularly important with respect to IEC61508. This
includes test coverage analysis, static code analysis and test automation. There are plenty
of tools to choose from and many of them are ﬂexible and can be combined and linked
to create a tool chain to support the SafeScrum process. The IEC61508 standard has
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requirements to tools and should be checked (IEC61508-3, Sect. 7.4.4, and table A3).
The walkthrough of our case will provide concrete examples of such a tool chain (Fig. 3).
Fig. 2. The SafeScrum model
5 A SafeScrum Case
The authors have been working with Autronica Fire & Security for about two years in
order to detail and trial the SafeScrum process in a real SIL3 industrial case. This
collaboration is part of a large R&D project, partly funded by the Research Council of
Norway. The collaboration is organized as an action research project [2] and the case
being described here shows some of the ﬁndings, so far. All data are collected, managed
and reported according to a joint R&D contract.
Autronica Fire & Security [1], with 380 employees, is an internationally leading
provider of ﬁre and gas detection systems. A large part of the business is oﬀshore instal‐
lations at oilrigs and ships where demands for safety performance are high. Our case is
a project developing new software for a ﬁre detection system, SIL 3.
The authors have followed the case project from the start and collected data in the
form of 1) observations of sprint review and planning meetings (11), 2) analysis of
documentation like project plans and requirements documents, and 3) interviews and
discussions with the Scrum team and related roles. This also includes the assessor (a
TÜV organization), which has been asked to comment on our development process
(SafeScrum). This dialogue has been important to ensure that the development process
and the documentation it produces meet the expectations and is aligned with the
IEC61508 standard. The product being developed by the case project itself is however
not yet certiﬁed – the completion is still some years ahead. In addition to this participative
role in the shaping of SafeScrum, the researchers also made an analysis of the standard
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to identify any issues with respect to using an agile method [18]. Such issues were
discussed with the Scrum team to ensure compliance. The SafeScrum process has
emerged through practice. It started out by using only a few fundamental principles, like
short iterations and daily standups. Based on growing experience and dialogue between
researchers, team members, the product owner and the external assessor, the SafeScrum
process and related tools are continuously being reﬁned and extended.
The project started development in January 2014 with a Scrum team of ﬁve experi‐
enced and co-located developers, one of them also acting as Scrum Master. Previous
experience and education in Scrum were low – only one of the developers had some
experience with Scrum from his previous workplace. Other than that the team read a
basic introduction [8], and in addition the researchers had a few seminars at the case
company, addressing agile principles, research and examples.
This was the ﬁrst attempt at applying Scrum in the development department and
started out with a simplistic process. Sprint duration was set to four weeks. The team
shared workspace with separate oﬃces and a common area in between and used a
whiteboard with stickers to track work items and their ﬂow from planned, in progress
to done. The product owner role was managed by a company internal with extensive
knowledge of the market, the requirements, and the technology. The team focused on
producing working code and unit tests from early on and a put emphasis on improving
the Scrum process continuously. Each sprint ended with a sprint retrospective where the
process was evaluated by the team, adjustments were made and new tools were trialed
and added/removed as needed.
After a few sprints, Jira was introduced to manage the workﬂow and thus replaced
the manual scrum board. RMsis, a plug-in for Jira, was used to establish traceability of
the requirements management process. Conﬂuence was used to support team collabo‐
ration and to document the sprints, e.g. by storing memos from sprint reviews. Stash
and Git was used to manage software version control and code reviews and Bamboo
was used for continuous builds, tests and release management. Doxygen was used for
maintaining design and code documentation. In addition, a set of tools was used for
additional quality assurance; Gtest and Gmoc were used to manage unit tests, Squish
Coco was used for code coverage analysis and QAC/QACPP for static code analysis.
In total, these tools constitute a tool-chain where some of the tools are linked and
operate as a greater whole. In particular, Jira serves as a hub in the tool chain. There are
many alternative tools and ways of composing them, but in our case, this setup enables
the Scrum team to be both agile and to automate many of the additional requirements
imposed by the IEC61508 standard. Figure 3 shows how the tools are inter-related.
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Fig. 3. The tool-chain supporting the SafeScrum process
6 The Need for Extra Attention to Quality Management
The shaping and introduction of SafeScrum at the case company has been done step by
step and by building on growing experience. The described process extensions and the
tool chain made the team able to produce and maintain the information required to
achieve a SIL3 certiﬁcate. However, after a few months, and sprints, of operation we
saw that this also puts a burden on the team, and in particular on the Scrum master who
spent an increasingly large amount of time making sure that development was compliant
with IEC61508. Some corrective actions were made but there was a concern that some
glitches happened. It was also not clear what the most important considerations to make
were. In short, the project needed some clariﬁcation on quality assurance, and asked the
researchers for assistance.
This led us to consult the assessor to clarify his expectations for QA on three topics:
1. Question: Traceability of safety related requirements: Is it suﬃcient to have a trace
between documents or should it be possible to trace issues down to sections, pages,
or lines in the text?
Answer: The assessor requires a link between requirements and tests, e.g. by refer‐
ring to unique requirements ID in test cases.
Response: This level of trace is handled by a dedicated requirements management
tool, RMsis, linking requirements to tests that validates them, as well as linking
requirements and tests to design and code. However, we have identiﬁed a need to
manually verify that this is done correctly and to make necessary corrections. The
QA role shall continuously verify that traceability is kept up to date and verify that
all steps of the process are done.
Quality Assurance in Scrum Applied to Safety Critical Software 99
2. Question: The standard directs ‘limited use of interrupts, pointers and recursion’ –
are there exact limits or does it mean that we should avoid this as much as possible?
Answer: You should make a table with use of interrupts, pointers etc. and a simple
explanation for why this must be used.
Response: Someone needs to check for “bad code” in every sprint and decide whether
it should be corrected (refactored) or whether the table of reasoned exceptions should
be updated. This can be assisted by checking for pointers during static code analysis.
3. Question: Control of size and complexity: should we aim for speciﬁc limits for
module complexity?
Answer: You need to deﬁne something that is useful to you, and argue why – the
standard does not specify this.
Response: We have deﬁned a set of metrics and their values that are important for
this speciﬁc project. Checking code is done by tools (QAC and QACPP) but there
is a need to verify that this is done in every sprint and that any deviations are resolved,
typically by refactoring or improving code in the following sprint.
In addition to these issues raised from the dialogue with the assessor, we also saw that
quality of documentation and test coverage had become unsatisfactory. All in all, it
became obvious that the self-regulating quality mechanisms in Scrum were overloaded
and that there was a need to strengthen the QA function. A dedicated QA function is a
necessary part of SafeScrum, but it is important to remember that the entire team still
has a large responsibility for QA as well. The team plays an important role e.g. in retro‐
spectives to continuously improve the development process and in resolving issues that
are identiﬁed by the QA-role.
7 Shaping an Embedded QA Role in SafeScrum
Using the insights described above, the researchers, the Scrum team and the product
owner had a series of meetings to deﬁne a speciﬁc QA role in SafeScrum to alleviate
the problems. The traditional approach in this and similar organizations would be to
place the QA role as a specialized function in the line organization, outside the project.
We decided, however, to add the QA role to the Scrum team to be close to the activities
and to the information needed to execute quality assurance. This adds to the principle
of cross functional teams [12] in Scrum. We are also considering making this a rotating
role to make it a shared responsibility and to share the workload. We need a QA log to
trace ﬁndings, decisions, corrective actions, and the follow up/results of these. In our
case, Conﬂuence is a good tool to establish this log. We have identiﬁed four tasks:
QA Task 1: Check Code Metric Values for New or Changed Code: Neither the
IEC61508 standard nor the assessor provide directions on speciﬁc metrics and limits to
monitor at the component level. We have consulted the research literature [9] and used
Minitab to analyze data from code from previous projects at the case company to deﬁne
the following metrics and limits: (1) number of static paths – STPTH: 250, (2) McCabe’s
cyclomatic number – STCYC: 15, (3) number of parameters – STPAR: 5, (4) function
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call count – STSUB: 13, (5) maximum nesting of control structures – STMIF: 5, (6)
number of executable lines – STXLN: 70, and (7) Myer’s value – (STMCC): 10.
QAC is used to analyze new and changed code to produce values for the metrics.
This is done at the end of each sprint. The metrics are displayed, together with their
deﬁned maximum values in a radar plot. It is thus easy to if there are metrics that are
exceeding their deﬁned limits. If the values are inside their limits, QA will accept the
code. If one or more values are outside their limits, the code is presented by QA in the
sprint review meeting where the team decides to either accept the violation or plan
refactoring. If the violation is accepted, a brief explanation must be added to the log and
potentially also in the code (required by the standard). If the violation is unacceptable,
the team needs to deﬁne a new task in Jira to refactor the code.
QA Task 2: Check Documentation Coverage: Check new/changed code to ensure
proper inline documentation and documents in Doxygen. This has to be done manually.
In case of missing or poor documentation, the QA-log should be updated and the ﬁndings
should be discussed in the sprint review meeting to decide how to resolve it (giving a
task to someone in the team). This check could be done at the end of each sprint.
QA Task 3: Check Test Coverage: Check for code coverage using Squish Coco. The
QA log should be updated with references to uncovered code. This could be checked by
the end of each sprint. Uncovered code should be discussed at the sprint review meeting
and the team should deﬁne corrective actions, like deﬁning tasks to produce tests.
According to the standard, the coverage should be at least 99%.
QA Task 4: Check Requirements-Task-Code Traceability: For new requirements,
tasks, and code check that 1) requirements (RMsis) is linked to issues (e.g. in Jira), and
2) that code (e.g. Stash) is linked to issues (e.g. Jira). The QA role should control
consistency at the end of the sprint and the team should resolve any identiﬁed issues
immediately. The IEC61508 standard provides a set of explicit requirements for trace‐
ability; see table A.4 – Software design and development – detailed design, and table
A.5 – Software design and development – software module testing and integration. We
consulted the assessor about a deﬁnition of ‘module’ and its size (LOC). He referred to
part 7, chapter C.2.9: “a software module should have a single well-deﬁned task or
function to fulﬁll.” The assessor recommended 1000 LOC as an upper limit. In cases
where the limit is exceeded it should be explained and documented.
The tasks have been deﬁned to be as simple and inexpensive as possible, partly by using
the tool chain that already is in place. The goal is to not add more work to the process
ceremony than strictly needed, but to use the QA role to simplify the sprint reviews so
that they are not bogged down with unimportant details. So far, this is done by letting
the QA close issues that have low risk and complexity on his own in advance of the
sprint retrospective, where the whole team participates. This reduces the time spent on
unimportant decisions and helps the team focus on diﬃcult tasks where a joint evaluation
and decision is needed.
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There should be a list of which criteria’s the team members shall have done before
the issue can be set as resolved and the QA needs to check that they have been fulﬁlled
(not do them himself). The project should also create a list of which criteria’s where the
QA can close an issue without any further investigation. Only QA or the team can move
an issue from resolved status to closed status. Closed issues cannot be changed.
8 Conclusions
After around two years of shaping and using SafeScrum we see that the inherent quality
assurance mechanisms in Scrum are not suﬃcient to meet the demands imposed by the
IEC61508 standard. We have consulted the assessor to ensure a proper match with the
standard and shaped a new role to Scrum.
Developing safety critical solutions using SafeScrum, calls for a lot of extra attention,
ceremony and documentation, which initially may be seen as a threat to the ability to be
agile [13]. However, we see that the iterative nature of Scrum with frequent breaks
between the sprints in addition to the tool chain we have put into use makes it possible
to manage quality assurance internally in the team without adding too much extra work.
As part of further work we will look into opportunities to streamline and perfect this
new role as it is vital to maintain an eﬃcient SafeScrum process and to meet the require‐
ments of the IEC61508 standard and the assessors expectations. One viable step would
be to add tool support to assist the QA role in order to collect and analyze quality infor‐
mation with less eﬀort and with more precision. The authors have been involved in the
U-QASAR FP7 EU project, which has developed a tool that serves as a central quality
dashboard consolidating quality information in a uniﬁed overview. We will look into
integrating this with the tool chain as a new tool for the team and the QA role.
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